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Abstract 
Assets under management by public funds, including sovereign wealth funds and sovereign pension funds, continues to grow at a 
strong pace.  As funds grow larger and new sovereign funds come into the market, the identification of suitable investments in an 
increasingly crowded marketplace becomes correspondingly more difficult.  The universe of potential investments is narrowed by 
a trust deficit between many sovereign funds and the regulators in countries in which these funds invest; this trust deficit can 
result in higher transactional costs that price public funds out of the market, or can create unacceptably high regulatory risks that 
deter funds from considering certain investments.  Because transparency can foster trust, this paper seeks to remedy the trust 
deficit by outlining a disclosure framework for investment policies that are most relevant to recipient country regulators. 
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1. Introduction 
Assets under management by public funds, including sovereign wealth funds and sovereign pension funds, 
continue to grow at a strong pace.  Sovereign wealth funds alone have grown from holding about $3.4 trillion in assets 
in March 2008 to about $6.4 trillion in assets in March 2014 (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2014). As funds grow 
larger and new sovereign funds come into the market, the identification of suitable investments in an increasingly 
crowded marketplace becomes correspondingly more difficult.  These difficulties are exacerbated by a trust deficit 
between many sovereign funds and the regulators in countries in which these funds invest.  
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How can public funds remedy this deficit? Several important efforts have already been initiated, and more are 
under development.  Most prominently, a group of sovereign wealth funds, assisted by the IMF, produced a now well-
known set of generally accepted principles and practices (GAPP) known as the “Santiago Principles.”  The purpose 
of the Santiago Principles was to “identify a framework of generally accepted principles and practices that properly 
reflect appropriate governance and accountability arrangements as well as the conduct of investment practices by 
SWFs on a prudent and sound basis.” International Working Group (2008). The Santiago Principles cover three key 
areas: (i) legal framework, objectives, and coordination with macroeconomic policies; (ii) institutional framework and 
governance structure; and (iii) investment and risk management framework.  This paper seeks to expand on the work 
in the third key area by providing a more detailed framework for disclosure of public fund investment policies.1 
Investment policy disclosure has important benefits for the sovereign, but it also presents risks.  For example, 
Dixon and Monk argue that sovereign investors may have difficulty in explaining performance results and investment 
strategies to their constituencies, particularly when the constituencies view fund performance with a short-term 
orientation (as may be the case with elected politicians that hold the fund’s purse strings).  Additionally, “domestic 
opponents of a country’s SWF could utilize the poor performance to reinforce their argument against the existence of 
the fund or the fund’s strategy.” This, they argue, may lead the fund to adopt a short-term investment approach and/or 
decrease transparency. Dixon & Monk (2012).   
While short-termism is a legitimate concern, to the extent it is an issue for public funds it is more likely the result 
of the disclosure of performance metrics (the ‘how’) than the disclosure of general investment strategies (the ‘what’).   
Arguably, performance metrics are most relevant to the domestic audience that has a stake in the performance of the 
fund.  They are not likely to be of much value to a recipient country regulator in evaluating whether or not to approve 
a particular transaction.  By contrast, the investment policies of the fund—the ‘what’—are highly relevant to a 
recipient country regulator as it attempts to determine the purpose of a fund’s investment and how a sovereign fund 
will engage with the company or project in which it has invested.  Under this view, as expressed in the Santiago 
Principles, disclosure can help to “reduce protectionist pressures, and help maintain an open and stable investment 
climate.”2 International Working Group (2008). 
2. A Framework for Public Fund Investment Policy Disclosure 
Investment policies serve a number of different purposes.  They can provide discipline and guidance to investment 
activities by setting appropriate risk tolerances and time horizons.  They may also prescribe certain types of 
investments and proscribe others, acting as a reflection of the ethical concerns of the fund’s public beneficiaries.  With 
respect to both purposes, policies that provide information on the goals and governance impact of an investment are 
most relevant to recipient country regulators.  These policies are more relevant than policies that address the 
governance of the fund itself, because regulators are primarily concerned with the impact of a particular investment.  
However, fund governance issues may be relevant as well, particularly as they relate to the independence (or lack 
thereof) from the fund’s sponsor government.   
 
Assuming the critical importance of investment policies and governance impacts, and with a view to increasing 
trust with recipient country regulators so as to broaden the universe of possible investments, public funds should 
consider disclosing eight key investment policies, explained in turn: 
 
1. Does the fund manage assets internally? 
 
 
1 The Santiago Principles contain a relevant subprinciple, but with little guidance on the kind of information that should be disclosed.  
Subprinciple 18.3 states that “[a] description of the investment policy of the SWF should be publicly disclosed,” and explains that “[t]he 
description could include qualitative statements on the investment style (e.g., active/passive, financial/strategic) or investment themes, the 
investment objectives, the investment horizon, and the strategic asset allocation. These disclosures, together with the disclosure of relevant 
financial information…should give an indication of risk appetite and exposure. In addition, the SWF may describe the use of leverage in its 
portfolio or disclose other meaningful measures of financial risk exposure.” International Working Group (2008). 
2 International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds has stated in a separate publication that “Disclosure of elements of their investment policy is an 
important way for Members to reassure portfolio companies, recipient countries, and other stakeholders about the Member‘s commercial nature.” 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (2011). 
7 Paul Rose /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  5 – 16 
Although the use of external managers can be used to mask investment activity, a fund which primarily or 
exclusively employs external managers may have less direct impact on corporate governance issues because it has 
likely outsourced both investment decisions and control over the investments.  Internal management may be beneficial 
for a variety of reasons—not least because it saves a fund from paying management fees and carried interest—but it 
also requires significant governance infrastructure, and entails policies (and disclosure of policies) on the governance 
issues discussed in this paper. 
 
2. Is the fund subject to binding quantitative asset allocation standards? 
Asset allocation standards help provide an understanding of the risk appetite and overall investment strategies of 
the fund.  Particularly, they can help to signal that the fund has a financial orientation.   
 
3. Is the fund prohibited from investing in certain kinds of assets (other than investments prohibited under Sharia 
law)? 
Investment prohibitions also signal fund purposes, and may also provide an indication of political influences on 
the fund. 
 
4. Is the fund required to invest in particular investments (such as domestic investments or “green” investments)? 
As with investment prohibitions, investment mandates provide an indication of political influences on the fund, as 
well the political context in which the fund operates. 
 
5. Are fund managers held to a prudent investor standard? 
An adequately enforced prudent investor standard signals that a fund is managed in accordance with due care and 
free from conflicts.  A prudent person standard indicates a reasonable, expert approach to investment, rather than 
investment for mercantilist purposes. 
 
6. Does the fund actively vote its equity shares? 
Active proxy voting indicates intent to influence the corporate governance of the firm.  Active proxy voting should 
not be viewed as a negative, particularly when the fund holds a relatively small block of shares; indeed, a failure to 
vote shares might exacerbate governance problems at a company by contributing to management entrenchment.  
However, active voting, where the fund owns a large enough block to control or influence the policies of a firm, may 
trigger a recipient country regulatory response.  Under U.S. law, for example, the mere ability to vote a controlling 
block of shares brings a transaction under the Foreign Investment and National Security Act, and so subject the 
investment to review or investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.3 United States 
Department of the Treasury (2008).  
 
7. Does the fund have expressed corporate governance policies and preferences? 
Where a fund does actively vote its shares or relies on internal management of its investments, clear policies on 
how the fund engages in corporate governance is vital to assuring recipient country regulators of a financial 
orientation.   
 
8. Does the fund have an ethics policy? 
 
 
3 Under U.S. law, the mere ability to vote a controlling block of shares will bring a transaction under the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act, and so subject the investment to review or investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (United 
States Department of the Treasury, 2008). 
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Finally, an ethics policy serves a crucial governance role in guiding fund officials, managers and employees in 
following an appropriate course of conduct in the fund’s dealings.  An ethics policy also indicates an internal 
governance commitment to recipient country regulators and others, which can alleviate concerns with how the fund 
invests and manages its investments. 
3. Review of Publicly Disclosed Pension Fund Policies 
The paper now turns to a review of the current investment policy disclosures of the 25 largest (by AUM) SWFs in 
the world, as listed by the Sovereign Wealth Institute, and the 26 largest (by AUM) SPFs, as listed in the Pension & 
Investments/Towers Watson 300 Ranking (2012). The policies discussed in this paper were obtained directly from the 
funds when possible, and using data available as of March 2014.  Because a minority of funds (primarily SWFs) does 
not disclose investment policies, caution should be used in interpreting these results.  Many funds may have extensive 
internal policies but choose not to disclose these policies, and the lack of disclosure should not be taken as evidence 
that such policies do not exist.   
Not every fund provides disclosure on each of these issues.  When possible, reference was made to other sources 
of data on such funds to corroborate or augment disclosed data.  For each issue studied, the percentage of funds 
disclosing such policies is noted, and differences between the disclosures of SPFs and SWFs are highlighted as 
appropriate.  
3.1. Internal and external management 
Funds vary widely in the extent to which they use external asset managers. For example, the Japanese Government 
Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) is primarily managed by 28 external managers with 77 mandates charging relatively 
low investment management fees; a small portion of assets in the domestic bond category are investment in house.  
By contrast, about 75% of Sweden’s AP Fonden 2 is managed in house, although at least 10% must be managed by 
external managers by purchase of mutual funds of discretionary management. 
Because the funds studied here are the largest in the world, it is to be expected that these funds would tend to show 
the highest amount of internal asset management, given that they have the economies of scale necessary to justify 
large in-house teams.  However, while most funds manage their assets primarily in-house, almost all funds have at 
least some external management of assets, and a large number of funds rely primarily on external managers. 
 
 
 
47%
39%
12%
2%
Fig. 1. Asset Management Style
Primarily internal
Primarily external
Not disclosed
About 50% managed internally, 50%
managed externally
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Table 1. Asset Management Style 
Primarily internal 24 
Primarily external 20 
Not disclosed 6 
About 50% managed internally, 50% managed externally 1 
 
3.2. Quantitative asset allocation regulation 
Almost all funds disclose that they operate under explicit allocation targets or ranges that limit the type and amount 
of investments they are able to make.  In many cases these limits are set by statute, and in a smaller number of cases 
the funds are restricted through internal policies.  This is more likely to be the case with entities such as CPPIB which, 
as independent entities from the central government, enjoy greater autonomy over their investment policies. 
While there is an average allocation across all SPFs and SWFs, it is not possible to determine an average asset 
allocation regulatory scheme.  Sovereigns regulate their funds in various ways that make comparisons difficult.  For 
example, some funds operate within ranges rather than set upper or lower limits, and while one fund may have a cap 
(but no floor) on certain asset investments, another fund may employ a floor (but no cap) on other types of assets.  
Additionally, some funds, such as the Alaska Permanent Fund, do not use traditional asset allocation categories such 
as “Equity,” “Fixed Income,” “Cash or Equivalents,” and “Alternative Investments” such as private equity, hedge 
funds or infrastructure.  The APF instead classifies investments as “Cash and Interest Rates,” “Company Exposure,” 
“Real Assets,” and “Special opportunities.”  Additionally, some funds only list part of their target allocation strategy.   
Altogether, 25 of the 51 funds surveyed provide some kind of disclosure of the regulations governing their asset 
allocation strategies.  While the practices vary widely, several themes appear through the data set out below: 
 
Table 2. Quantitative Asset Allocations 
 
Restricts 
domestic 
investments 
Restricts 
foreign 
investments 
Restricts 
equity 
Restricts 
Ownership 
percentages 
of equity 
Restricts 
fixed 
income 
Restricts 
by 
currency 
risk 
Restricts 
non-publicly 
traded 
investments 
Percentage of reporting SPFs 27% (7) 19% (5) 31% (8) 19% (5) 23% (6) 23% (6) 31% (8) 
Percentage of reporting SWFs 28% (7) 16% (4) 24% (6) 4% (1) 20% (5) 0% (0) 20% (5) 
Total 27% (14) 18% (9) 27% (14) 12% (6) 22% (11) 12% (6) 25% (13) 
 
Most funds have some sort of limitation on domestic ownership, either by explicitly requiring assets to be invested 
abroad or by restricting the amount of assets that may be invested domestically.  While many funds also have 
restrictions on foreign investments, these restrictions typically take the form of permissible ranges within which a 
fund may invest in foreign assets.  Similar range limitations on fixed income ownership are also seen in many funds, 
and range limitations for equity investments are found in the policies of most funds, and more particularly in SWF 
asset allocation policies.  Interestingly (but perhaps not surprisingly), restrictions on ownership percentages are much 
more common for SPFs than SWFs, reflected in the fact that some SWFs take large, and occasionally even controlling, 
blocks of shares of many companies.  SPFs and SWFs also differ in that several SPFs (and no SWFs) have limitations 
in their asset allocation policies designed to limit currency risk.   
Actual asset allocations will, of course, differ at least marginally from the target asset allocation standards set out 
in the statutes or regulations that control the funds’ investment behavior. 
3.3. ESG investing and prohibitions on investing in certain categories of assets 
Environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors are an increasingly important issue for many sovereign funds.  
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Occasionally, funds are required by the sovereign sponsor to avoid certain types of investments on ethical, social or 
political grounds.  A well-known example, Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, has explicit restrictions on 
investments in companies that “a) produce weapons that violate fundamental humanitarian principles through their 
normal use; b) produce tobacco; and c) sell weapons or military material to [certain] states . . ..” Norway Council on 
Ethics (2013).  The Norwegian Ministry of Finance may, on the advice of the Council of Ethics of the GPFG, restrict 
investment in any company for which there is an unacceptable risk that the company contributes to or is responsible 
for “a) serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour, the 
worst forms of child labour and other child exploitation; b) serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations 
of war or conflict; c) severe environmental damage; d) gross corruption; or e) other particularly serious violations of 
fundamental ethical norms.”  Not all funds are prohibited from making such investments, but have policies that require 
the fund to consider ethical, social or governance (ESG) factors when making investment decisions.  One SPF, 
France’s Fonds de Reserve pour les Retraites, has disclosed an ESG component to its investment selection, announcing 
that it will “help to finance companies the corporate mission of which is to preserve the environment or are beneficial 
to society. . .. [This approach] enables it to be exposed to themes such as water, eco-technology, waste treatment and 
management, renewable energy via a selection of investment funds run by dedicated managers.  Fonds de Réserve 
Pour Les Retraites (2013). 
ESG issues aside, in some cases funds are not merely limited in their allocations to certain asset classes, as 
described in the preceding section, but are prohibited from making such investments altogether.  These prohibitions 
typically keep funds from investing in asset classes that are deemed to be imprudent or otherwise inappropriate for 
the fund, such as alternative investments, commodities, derivative instruments and, in one case, even equities.  
 
Table 3. ESG Investments and Asset Class Restrictions 
 
ESG 
Restrictions 
ESG 
Considerations ESG Mandate 
Asset Class 
Restrictions 
Percentage of reporting SPFs 23% (6) 19% (5) 4% (1) 38% (10) 
Percentage of reporting SWFs 12% (3) 4% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Total 18% (9) 12% (6) 4% (1) 20% (10) 
 
 
3.4. Mandate to invest in particular investments (such as domestic or foreign securities) 
A mirror image of a requirement to avoid certain asset classes is an explicit mandate to invest in certain assets.  
ESG requirements and considerations and asset class prohibitions are not found in a majority of disclosed investment 
policies of the world’s largest public funds, and specific mandates to invest in certain asset classes are even less 
common.   
 
Table 4. Investment Mandates 
 
Domestic 
investment 
Foreign 
investment 
Specific 
sector 
Investment 
Percentage of reporting SPFs 15% (4) 8% (2) 4% (1) 
Percentage of reporting SWFs 0% (0) 12% (3) 4% (1) 
Total 8% (4) 10% (5) 4% (2) 
 
A number of SPFs have explicit mandates to invest a portion (and in some cases, all) of their funds in domestic 
securities such as domestic bonds (Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund, and Belgium’s Zilverfond) or 
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domestic equities (Norway’s Government Pension Fund).  South Korea’s National Pension Service is required to use 
some of its assets for public service projects.  Domestic investments—pension funds. 
SWFs, by contrast, typically do not have explicit domestic investment mandates.4  As explained by Das et al.:  
Using assets in SWFs to purchase domestic inputs could stimulate domestic demand, and put upward 
pressure on prices. This may result in an appreciation in the real effective exchange rate, with 
adverse consequences for exports and growth. On the other hand, sterilization of domestic input 
financing could lead to higher interest rates and crowd out private sector investments. Thus, while 
the new domestic project could add to output, it may also through the real exchange rate undermine 
private exports and domestic investment, often the real sources of growth. Das et al. (2009). 
It is not surprising, then, that none of the surveyed SWFs have disclosed specific domestic investment mandates 
(Gelb et. al, however, do find general domestic mandates with some funds.  Gelb et. al (2013)).  Three have explicit 
foreign investment mandates, however, including Norway’s Government Pension Fund-Global, China Investment 
Corporation, and the Russia Reserve Fund.  In each case, however, the sovereigns imposing explicit external mandates 
also have funds that include domestic investment components (Norway’s Government Pension Fund, Central Huijin 
(a subsidiary of CIC), and Russia’s National Wealth Fund).   
Two funds, the SWF Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Company (not to be confused with Abu Dhabi’s larger 
SWF, ADIA) and the Ireland SPF, NRPF, have disclosed sector-specific investments.  Abu Dhabi has allocated a 
portion of its portfolio to invest globally in energy and energy-related industries.  Ireland has agreed to invest in 
technology-focused funds managed by SVB Capital.  In a “separate transaction”, Silicon Valley Bank “expects to 
deploy US$100 million of new lending commitments to fast-growing Irish technology, life science, cleantech, private 
equity and venture capital businesses over five years, subject to its usual lending criteria.” Silicon Valley Bank (2013). 
NRPF has thus cleverly used a sector-specific investment to facilitate domestic investment in a way that may help to 
reduce some of the waste and opportunities for corruption that sometimes accompany domestic investments. 
3.5. Investment Management Standard 
Many, but not most, funds disclose the standard of care to which fund officials must adhere in their investment 
decisions and asset management.  As described above, under a “prudent investor,” the fiduciary must “discharge his 
or her duties with the care, skill, prudence and diligence that a prudent person acting in a like capacity would use in 
the conduct of an enterprise of like character and aims.” Galer (2002). Countries that follow the English common law 
tradition tend to use a “prudent investor” standard.  Thus, of the funds surveyed, the SPFs and SWFs from Canada, 
Ireland, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Alaska follow some form of the prudent investor rule.  Two funds 
from non-common law countries, the China Investment Corporation and the Korea Investment Corporation, also 
follow a form of the rule. 
Other funds disclose different standards that are not explicitly a form of the “prudent investor” rule, but nonetheless 
require loyalty or accountability of fund officials.   
 
 
 
4 There are, of course, funds most appropriately called sovereign development funds that do have such mandates, but none of the firms surveyed 
in this paper fall into that category (indeed, it is the focus on a domestic development mandate that separates “sovereign development funds” 
from “sovereign wealth funds”). There are also sovereign wealth funds that do have domestic investment mandates, but none of the funds 
surveyed disclose such a purpose. 
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Table 5. Investment Management Fiduciary Standards 
 
Prudent Investor 
Standard 
Other Fiduciary or 
Loyalty Standard 
Percentage of reporting SPFs 12% (3) 12% (3) 
Percentage of reporting SWFs 20% (5) 8% (2) 
Total 16% (8) 10% (5) 
 
Because countries have different legal systems and different legal frameworks governing the management of state 
funds, it is unsurprising that standards of care would differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  There is, however, a 
significant benefit arising from the adoption of a common standard of fiduciary care and loyalty.  Common standards 
are beneficial because they provide positive network effects as jurisdictions develop a common framework.  A 
common framework can be useful in evaluating the activities of a fund in comparison to others. A body of best 
practices or other “soft law” generated from a common standard is likewise beneficial to all parties using the standard.   
Jurisdictions not using a common standard of fiduciary duty like the prudent investor standard can, of course, 
benefit from the practices of other, “prudent investor” jurisdictions.  Likewise, jurisdictions using a “prudent investor” 
standard can benefit from the best practices developed by jurisdictions using other fiduciary standards.   
While positive network externalities benefit those in the network and may even provide beneficial effects to those 
outside of the network, there is a downside to a common standard.  In the case of a prudent investor rule, its very 
operation risks creating a regulatory irony by encouraging a natural herding effect. If funds evaluate prudence in part 
by the activities of other funds, over time all funds using the standard may herd towards less desirable investment 
activities.  This undesirable activity may be manifest in excessive risk-taking, but could also manifest itself in 
insufficient risk-taking. 
3.6. Proxy Voting 
A regularly expressed concern with sovereign investment is that because SPFs and SWFs are sovereign funds, they 
may serve as mercantilist tools for the sovereign owner.  Some academic literature has attempted to address this 
possibility and how to prevent it, including Gilson and Milhaupt (2008), Rose (2008) and Epstein and Rose (2009), 
and at least one significant study by Mehrpouya, Huang and Barnett (2009) has attempted to review specific corporate 
governance engagement by public funds.  The study examined the behavior of ten of the largest funds, including 
ADIA, AGFF, CIC, GIC, KIA, LIA, GPFG, QIA, RRF, NWF, and Temasek Holdings (Singapore).  All but the 
Russian funds—RRF and NWF—held equity positions at the time of the study. 
Obtaining information on engagement and proxy voting is difficult because most countries do not require 
disclosure of shareholders’ proxy votes.  Consistent with the behavior of most other large institutional investors, most 
SWFs and SPCs do not publish their proxy voting policies, though Norway’s GPFG is a notable exception to this rule.  
Likewise, as with proxy voting policies, only GPFG discloses actual proxy votes. This lack of transparency makes it 
difficult to ascertain whether SWFs behave similarly to other types of funds, such as pension funds, endowment funds, 
or mutual funds. However, from interviews with some prominent SWF portfolio companies, Mehrpouya, Huang and 
Barnett were able to determine that most SWFs exercise their proxy voting rights. 
The study by Mehrpouya et al. is also important in that it evaluates compliance by the funds with the Santiago 
Principles.  Under GAPP 21 of the Santiago Principles,  
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental element of their equity investments’ 
value. If an SWF chooses to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner that is 
consistent with its investment policy and protects the financial value of its investments. The SWF 
should publicly disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed entities, including the key 
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factors guiding its exercise of ownership rights. 5 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (2008). 
In their 2009 survey, Mehrpouya et al. find only three funds in compliance with GAPP 21.  Since that time, several 
other SWFs have also disclosed at least some information about how they vote their shares, although the results should 
not be taken to mean that the funds are in compliance with GAPP 21, as this survey only reviewed whether the funds 
disclosed whether they exercised voting rights; qualitative judgments may differ on what constitutes a GAPP 21-
compliant discussion of “key factors guiding . . . exercise of voting rights” Mehrpouya et al. (2009). 
In this review, 27 of 51 funds provided some disclosure of their proxy voting policies, with SPFs tending to provide 
such disclosures more often than SWFs.   
 
Table 6. Proxy Voting Policies 
 
Actively Votes 
Shares 
Primarily 
Passive/Does Not 
Vote 
Uses a Proxy Advisor to 
Vote 
Percentage of reporting SPFs 46% (12) 12% (3) 15% (4) 
Percentage of reporting SWFs 24% (6) 24% (6) 0% (0) 
Total 35% (18) 18% (9) 8% (4) 
 
The surveyed public funds, as a group, tend to actively vote their shares.  However, only about half of the SWFs 
state that they actively vote their proxies, while the other funds state that they are predominantly passive or do not 
vote their shares.  Several funds use a proxy advisor to manage its proxy voting, typically in accordance with voting 
policies provided by the fund itself. 
 
3.7. Expressed corporate governance policies and preferences 
A closely related (and in some cases, overlapping) issue to proxy voting policies are the corporate governance 
preferences and policies of a fund.  A minority of funds have articulated specific corporate governance preferences 
for the public and private firms in which they invest.  Typically, such disclosures describe in basic terms what 
corporate governance measures a fund is likely to support.  Some funds, including the CPP, provide a model of best 
practices in governance disclosure.  CPPIB produces a Report on Responsible Investing and a complementary 21-
page document entitled “Our Approach to Responsible Investing”, which also includes the CPPIB’s proxy voting 
guidelines.  CPPIB’s disclosure of how it views executive compensation issues is illustrative of the quality of 
disclosure it provides on why it engages on governance issues: 
CPPIB believes that a clear and appropriate link between pay and performance is critical to aligning the 
interests of management with those of long-term investors. When these interests are aligned, long-term 
shareholder value is more likely to be created. When they are not, the result is often ineffective and short-term 
corporate management. 
CPPIB also provides disclosure on how it engages with companies in which it invests.  With respect to executive 
compensation, for example, CPPIB seeks “A clear link between pay and performance that appropriately aligns the 
board, management and investors and that emphasizes long-term and sustainable growth of shareholder value,” and a 
 
 
5 The Explanation and Commentary to GAPP 21 states,  
To dispel concerns about potential noneconomic or nonfinancial objectives, SWFs should disclose ex ante whether and how they 
exercise their voting rights. This could include, for example, a public statement that their voting is guided by the objective to 
protect the financial interests of the SWF. In addition, SWFs should disclose their general approach to board representation. When 
SWFs have board representation, their directors will perform the applicable fiduciary duties of directors, including representation 
of the collective interest of all shareholders. To demonstrate that their voting decisions continue to be based on economic and 
financial criteria, SWFs could also make appropriate ex post disclosures. 
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“[c]lear rationale and full disclosure in corporate reporting.” Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (2013). 
Among SWFs, the GPFG and AGFF are again leaders on corporate governance issues and disclosure of governance 
policies.  AGFF, for example, makes significant policy disclosures on a range of governance issues.  As a point of 
comparison, AGFF provides the following on executive compensation issues: 
Companies should have appropriate performance evaluation and incentive systems. Performance 
related payments should be aligned with shareholders’ interests by being linked to continuous 
productivity improvement giving rise to growth in earnings and dividends. Australian Government 
Future Fund (2012). 
In a small number of cases, funds relying extensively on external managers also provide basic guidelines for how 
the managers should vote shares held on behalf of the fund.  The APF, for example, states that it is the governing 
board’s responsibility to “encourage but not require managers to consider the following principles when voting 
proxies,” including “proxy matters dealing with a corporate governance process have the potential to improve board-
shareholder dynamics for an extended period,” “board independence,” and certain “proposals have the potential to 
impact corporate governance and improve board shareholder dynamics.” 6  Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation 
(2010).   
As noted below, a significant number of funds—primarily SPFs—are also signatories to the United Nation-
sponsored Principles for Responsible Investment.  UNPRI signatories commit to six principles, including: (1) 
incorporating ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes; (2) being active owners and 
incorporating ESG issues into ownership policies and practices; (3) seeking appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by 
the entities in which the signatories invest; (4) promoting acceptance and implementation of the UNPRI within the 
investment industry; (5) working together to enhance effectiveness in implementing the UNPRI; and (6) reporting on 
activities and progress towards implementing the UNPRI. PRI Association (2014). 
 
Table 7. Corporate Governance Preferences 
 Governance 
Preferences or 
Governance 
Guidelines UNPRI Signatory 
Percentage of reporting SPFs 50% (13) 38% (10) 
Percentage of reporting SWFs 24% (6) 4% (1) 
Total 37% (19) 22% (11) 
 
Every fund that is a UNPRI signatory also provides significant disclosures on corporate governance preferences. 
 
3.8. Internal Ethics Policy 
A final category of policy disclosures does not cover investment policies per se, but rather whether the fund has a 
code of ethics or code of conduct applicable to fund officials and staff.  A code of ethics helps to ensure that 
investments are made in accordance with the fund’s investment policies and any other relevant regulations.  The 
Santiago Principles note the importance of a code of ethics in GAPP 13, stating that “[p]rofessional and ethical 
standards should be clearly defined and made known to the members of the SWF’s governing body(ies), management, 
 
 
6 The APF encourages managers to vote for proposals that support a) independent compensation, nominating, and audit board committees; b) 
majority of independent directors; c) confidential voting by shareholders; d) right of shareholders to act by written consent; e) right of 
shareholders to call a special meeting; f) requirement that shareholders approve poison pills, payment of greenmail, or dual-class share structures; 
g) requirement that the audit firm be limited to performing audits only; and h) except for companies that allow cumulative voting, election of 
directors by a majority of shareholder votes or adoption of director resignation policies for directors receiving more “withhold” versus “for” 
votes, and proposals that are against: a) classified or staggered boards; and b) supermajority vote requirements.   
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and staff.” International Working Group (2008). 
As the preceding sections demonstrate, SPFs tend to provide better disclosure of their policies than SWFs. In the 
case of ethical codes, however, more SWFs than SPFs disclose that they have a code of ethics in place.   
 
Table 8. Code of Ethics 
 Internal Ethics Policy 
Percentage of reporting SPFs 31% (8) 
Percentage of reporting SWFs 44% (11) 
Total 37% (19) 
 
Most funds disclose only the existence of an internal code of ethics. GIC, for example, states that “[w]e expect the 
highest standards of honesty from everyone in GIC, both in our work and in our personal lives. This includes abiding 
by the laws of the countries we invest in, and observing our code of ethics in letter and in spirit.” GIC Private Limited 
(2014). 
A few funds disclose the entire code of ethics.  Mubadala’s disclosure is exemplary in this respect; the fund 
discloses its full, 73-page code of ethics.  The code covers a wide variety of ethical issues, including “preventing 
improper payments in cash or in kind,” “preventing money laundering,” “protecting intellectual property and 
confidential information,” and “serving in our communities,” among many other topics. Mubadala Group (2010). 
4. Conclusion 
Sovereign funds show a great variety of practices in how they disclose their investment policies.  As argued in this 
article, sovereign funds can reduce the “trust deficit” between them and regulators by providing better disclosure of 
key policies.  Disclosure reduces political risk, which in turn expands the universe of potential investments for 
sovereign funds. 
Acknowledgements 
The author thanks Brittany Pace and Joseph Perruzzi for their diligent research assistance, and thanks participants 
at the Fifth Joint BIS/World Bank Public Investors Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions.  All errors 
remain the responsibility of the author. 
References 
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, 2010. Investment Policy, http://www.apfc.org/home/Media/investments/20101201InvestPolicy.pdf.   
Australian Government Future Fund, 2012. Statement of Investment Policies, 
http://www.futurefund.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/4120/Statement_of_Investment_Policies_February_2012_A227802.pdf 
Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, 2013. Our Approach to Responsible Investing, 
http://www.cppib.com/content/dam/cppib/How%20we%20invest/Responsible%20Investing/Responsible%20investing%20reports/CPPIB%2
0Approach%20to%20Responsible%20Investing%20-%20Updated%20Jan%2017%202014.pdf.  
Das, U. Lu, Y. Mulder, C. Sy, A., 2009. Setting up a Sovereign Wealth Fund: Some Policy and Operational Considerations, IMF Working Paper 
09/179. 
Dixon, A., Monk, A., 2012. Reconciling Transparency and Long-Term Investing Within Sovereign Funds, 2 J. of Sustainable F. & Investment, 
275-286.  
Epstein, R. Rose, A., 2009. The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 111. 
Fonds de Reserve pour les Retraites, 2013. Responsible Investment Strategy, 2014-2017, http://www.fondsdereserve.fr/documents/SRI-Strategy-
2013-2017.pdf. 
Galer, R., 2002.  “Prudent Person Rule” Standard for the Investment of Pension Fund Assets, Fin. Market Trends, Nov. 2002. 
Gelb, A. Tordo, S. Halland, H. Arfaa, N. Smith, G., 2013. Sovereign Wealth Funds and Long-Term Development Finance: Risks and 
Opportunities, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6776. 
GIC Private Limited, 2014.  Code of Ethics,  http://www.gic.com.sg/about-gic/code-of-ethics. 
16   Paul Rose /  Procedia Economics and Finance  29 ( 2015 )  5 – 16 
Gilson, R., Milhaupt, C., 2008. Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 
Stanford L. Rev. 1345. 
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2011. IFSWF Members’ Experiences in the Application of the Santiago Principles, 
http://www.ifswf.org/pst/stp070711.pdf. 
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 2008. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices-“Santiago 
Principles”, http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.   
Mehrpouya, A. Huang, C. Barnett, T., 2009.  An Analysis of Proxy Voting and Engagement Policies of the Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/Sovereign_Wealth_Funds_Report-October_2009.pdf.   
Mubadala Group, 2010. Code of Conduct, http://www.mubadala.com/sites/default/files/Mubadala%20C0C_English%20version%202.pdf. 
Norway Council on Ethics, 2013. Guidelines for the Observation and Exclusion of Companies from the Government Pension Fund Global’s 
Investment Universe, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics_council/ethical-guidelines.html?id=425277. 
PRI Association, 2006.  The Six Principles, http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/the-six-principles/. 
Rose, P., 2008. Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 83. 
Rose, P., 2013. Sovereign Investing and Corporate Governance: Evidence and Policy, 18 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 913. 
Silicon Valley Bank, 2012. Silicon Valley Bank Plans to Lend $100M to Irish Innovation Sector, http://www.svb.com/News/Company-
News/Silicon-Valley-Bank-Plans-to-Lend-$100M-to-Irish-Innovation-Sector/ (June 19, 2012).   
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 2014. Fund Rankings, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (last visited July 8, 2014). 
United States Department of the Treasury, 2008. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, RIN 1505-  
AB88, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS-Final-Regulations-new.pdf. 
 
 
